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     If I were a prince or a legislator, I should not waste  
     my time in saying what ought to be done; I should  
     do it, or hold my peace. (Rousseau) 
 
 
0. Introductory 
It seems natural to think that the liberal commitment to freedom of religion needs to 
proceed from or at least incorporate an account of what religion is, even if one thinks that 
ultimately any normative theory is bound to prescribe what the phenomena it decides to 
accommodate ought to be, or to become. The ‘ought’ part is the familiar locus of 
controversy among liberals of various stripes (secularist vs establishment-friendly, 
perfectionist vs neutralist, etc.). But the ‘is’ is not unambiguous or uncontroversial either: 
assuming, to range over a wide set of philosophies of social science, that any descriptive 
account of a social phenomenon will contain interpretive elements, we are left with the 
normatively laden question as to what values should guide the interpretation. In this paper 
I refrain from directly entering the ‘ought’ fry. Rather, I try to shed some light on the ‘is’, 
in the hope that it will help us make progress on the wider picture. So my background 
question is this: what exactly should be the relationship between the best available 
descriptive understanding(s) of religion and the account of religion featured in normative 
(liberal) theory?1   
Recent work in the political theory of religious freedom seeks to draw normative 
implications from the observation that much liberal theorising about religion operates with 
descriptively inaccurate accounts of the nature of religion. Perhaps the most prominent of 
those claims is that empirical evidence points towards the inadequacy of the standard 
liberal understanding of religion as a set of beliefs. Crudely, apart from early-modern and 
contemporary forms of (Protestant) Christianity and a few other exceptions, most religions 
are best understood primarily as social practices, not as belief systems. In light of this 
                                                            
1 My argument should generalise to any normative theory featuring a state. However I 
maintain my focus mostly on liberal theory because this makes engagement with relevant 
literature easier, and because freedom of religion is considered a central tenet of liberalism, 
but not of other first-order political doctrines. 
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interpretation of the phenomenon of religion, a number of theorists are now trying to 
integrate the practice-based view and other descriptively more accurate understandings of 
religion within the liberal framework, mainly in order to make the treatment of religions 
other than Christianity more equitable. Other, more radical theorists argue that the liberal 
ideal of religious freedom is hopelessly ethnocentric, and so a potentially fatal design flaw 
in the liberal edifice, at least under present, multicultural conditions.  
But the contrast between the traditional and the descriptively-informed versions of the 
theory of religious freedom does not cover the whole of logical space. Cécile Laborde 
(2015, forthcoming) is one of the few contemporary political theorists who have taken the 
description-driven arguments at heart while also casting doubt on their conclusions. 
Laborde points out that mere descriptions of social phenomena don’t tell us much about 
how to manage them normatively. A (liberal) state's primary task is not to understand social 
phenomena in the most accurate way possible, but to make them as legible as possible (to 
recast Laborde’s approach in James C. Scott’s terminology), relative to the state's 
purposes. Laborde then puts forward a specific way in which the state ought to change the 
way in which it makes the phenomenon of religion legible: in a nutshell, she proposes to 
disaggregate religion and spread its protection across a number of separate legal 
categories. In other words, the freedom we think of as ‘freedom of religion’ should be 
understood as a bundle of separate and relatively independent freedoms.  
In this essay I criticise that approach by pointing out that it is insufficiently sensitive to 
facts about the sorts of entities that liberal states are. In short, I argue that states have 
(internally) good reasons to mould phenomena such as religion into more easily 
governable monoliths—a realist version of the descriptive challenge to liberal religious 
freedom outlined above. If this is a problem from the normative point of view (e.g. from 
the point of view of fairness towards certain religions or towards non-religious citizens), it 
is not a problem to do with inadequate accounts of religion, but a problem with the sort of 
institutions states are. It is a problem that has to do with normative political theory’s 
tendency to overstate the pliability of institutions such as states. 
So this essay’s conclusion is perhaps best presented as a three-way disjunction. The 
first option is to simply maintain that if we are committed to the existence of liberal states 
then we must reckon with their historically determined limitations when it comes to 
managing changing social phenomena. Alternatively, if one thinks that the simplified 
monolithic account of religion is too exclusive to be true to liberal values, then one should 
perhaps direct one’s frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state. The final and 
more radical option is to think that the very existence of states is normatively problematic. 
All three options are compatible with the realist methodological stance deployed here.  
My argument proceeds as follows. In the first section I present and discuss what one 
may call the descriptive challenge to standard belief or obligation-centred liberal accounts 
of religion and religious freedom. In the second section I present Laborde’s reaction to this 
challenge, and the ensuing disaggregation approach to freedom of religion. In the third 
section, drawing on empirical studies, I put forward a critique of both the descriptive 
challenge and the disaggregation approach. In the fourth and final section I cement my 
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argument by drawing some wider methodological conclusions about the relationship 
between normative and descriptive theories of the (liberal) state, and set out the 
disjunction that is the upshot of my argument.  
 
1. The descriptive challenge to liberal religious freedom 
There is a a by now familiar critique of liberal policies of religious accommodation that 
can be read as taking its cue from Rousseau’s famous programmatic declaration to inquire 
into the legitimacy of political order “men being taken as they are and laws as they might 
be.” According to this critique, the liberal treatment of religion is normatively deficient 
because it is descriptively flawed (Fish 2000, Mahmood 2005, Spinner-Halev 2005, and 
others). While the critique takes various forms as well—not all compatible with each 
other—2he most common descriptive critique is that liberal religious freedom is unfair to 
some non-Western religions because it is modelled on post-Reformation Christianity, 
particularly Protestantism. The idea is that Protestant religion is belief-based, whereas 
many non-Western religions are practice-based (Spinner-Halev 2005). Laborde (2015) 
recently proposed a reformulation of this criticism: while traditional liberal law on 
religious accommodation is ultimately capable of correctly capturing what is valuable in 
beliefs as well as expressive practices, it is too narrowly focused on matters of obligation 
and conscience. For the purposes of my argument not much hangs on the practice vs 
obligation issue, nor on the distinctions between variants of the descriptive critique—the 
empirical focus of my argument will be more on the state than on religion anyhow, and I 
will return to the historical origins of liberal religious freedom below. For now it’s worth 
pointing out exactly in what sense the descriptive challenge is about descriptions. Crudely, 
the idea is that liberal states claim to be inclusive towards all forms of religions, but 
improved descriptions of religious belief and practice show us that that is not the case and 
even, arguably, that it couldn’t be the case. So the descriptive challenge makes a claim 
against the veracity of liberalism’s self-attributed inclusiveness towards all manner of 
religions. 
Our focus should remain on the methodological, or meta-theoretical issue of the role of 
empirical descriptions of religion (and of the state) in normative theorising. Indeed, the 
general thought that the liberal attitude to religion is a product of the Protestant 
Reformation is hardly novel in historical research (De Ruggiero 1927 [1925], Macpherson 
1962, Cavanaugh 2009, Gregory 2012), or even in contemporary liberal theory (Rawls 
1996). What is relatively novel (in political theory), however, is the thought that this 
particular genealogy of liberal religious freedom generates normative difficulties, perhaps 
                                                            
2 Laborde helpfully distinguishes between semantic, Protestant, and realist critiques 
(forthcoming, chapter 1). The semantic critique says that there is no usable empirical 
reference for the term ‘religion’. The Protestant critique focuses on the privileging of 
individual belief and conscience in liberal accounts of religion. The realist critique, on 
Laborde’s reading, says that the liberal liberal law of religious freedom is either 
unprincipled exercise of power or the imposition of the secular religion of liberalism. The 
realist critique I will offer here is related to this broad line of thought, though it need not 
lead to the same conclusions. t 
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more so once the range of religions present in liberal polities expands beyond the various 
branches of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. To capture that thought a general account of 
the bare structure of the descriptive challenge to traditional liberal religious freedom will 
suffice. The challenge can be schematically presented as follows: 
 
P1: Liberal accommodation of religion is modelled on Christianity/Protestantism 
(belief- and/or obligation-based, private religion). 
P2: Many non-Western religions are not belief- and/or obligation-based and/or they 
are not private. 
P3: In order to be fair, religious accommodation policy needs to be modelled on the 
salient characteristics of all affected religions. 
C: Liberal accommodation of religion is unfair to many non-Western religions. 
 
So the thought is that a descriptively inaccurate account of religion precludes fair 
treatment of religion. In order to know what to do about religion we need to use our best 
available understanding of what religion is. That seems plausible. Indeed there is a sense in 
which it is almost trivially true. But there is a more important sense in which it is false. In 
the next section we will see why there is reason to consider the above argument unsound. 
 
2. From description to disaggregation 
As anticipated, Cécile Laborde (2015) developed an influential critique of the 
descriptive challenge—one that takes on the critique’s empirical input while resisting its 
normative implications. Though we cannot explore themes beyond religion here, it is 
worth pointing out that Laborde’s move has wider implications about the political 
management of any social phenomenon that is a potential source of conflict. Let us begin 
by relating Laborde’s argument to the characterisation of the descriptive challenge I 
offered in the previous section. Laborde correctly observes that P3 is false:  
The political theorists’ approach is normative … It seeks to identify the core values 
that should be protected by the law. As a result, it eschews purely descriptive or 
semantic approaches to legal terms. When it considers freedom of religion, it is not 
concerned with defining what religion is – an elusive project at best, as critical 
scholars of religion have amply shown. Rather, it rejects any essentialist or 
semantic approach; and is concerned with identifying the core values that the law 
can properly express. … we would not want the law to capture the whole of the 
value of religion. At best, the law will put forward an interpretive notion of 
marriage, or of religion. That a particular law or theory does not capture what 
religion really is, therefore, is not, in itself, a sufficient objection to it. What matters 
is that the law, or the theory, expresses and protects the correct underlying values. It is at 
this more fundamental level that interpretive approaches must be assessed and 
evaluated. (2015: 2, emphasis added) 
The point here is that, even if describing religion were an easy task, it is not clear that 
it would yield the account of religion that needs to be enshrined in liberal law. States are 
not academic institutions. They are not in the business of describing reality for the sake of 
knowledge. Their nature is to channel social phenomena in ways that fit within their pre-
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constituted aims, chiefly the aim of securing order and stability. As we will see below, this 
resonates with James C. Scott’s (2005) analysis of states’ tendency to reinterpret and even 
transform social phenomena in order to make them legible, and so amenable to rule.  
In the next section I shall try to argue that taking seriously this insight as well as recent 
historical scholarship on religious conflict requires us to question some aspects of 
Laborde’s “disaggregation” account of religion within the liberal state. The key move in the 
disaggregation approach to liberal religious freedom is to give up on the project of 
specifying the contours of religious freedom as a single right. As James Nickel (2005) put 
it, we don’t need religious freedom. The things we may want to do because of our religious 
commitments can be captured by an array of different liberal rights (of expression, 
association, thought, movement, privacy, etc.), in a way that will dispel many well-known 
and seemingly intractable dilemmas—think of the plethora of examples in the 
multiculturalism literature, from headscarves to Sikhs and motorcycle helmets.3 Nickel 
defended this view primarily on legal-philosophical grounds. Laborde brings the abstract 
normative argument in conversation with the empirically-informed arguments put forward 
by the ‘critical religion’ scholars who advance the descriptive critique. So, to see what 
motivates the disaggregation account on the empirical side of the argument, we need to get 
clearer on Laborde’s interpretive response to the descriptive challenge:   
… it is not enough simply to say ‘religion is X and Y’. What is required is to 
identify the specific normative values which makes X or Y legally relevant. Just 
saying that a practice or institution is multi- faceted and internally complex, and 
irreducible to anything else (as is surely the case with religion) does not mean that 
it must be recognized as such in the law. … So we need to know what kind of good 
is being protected in every case, and the good cannot be assumed to follow from the 
mere description of the empirical dimension of religion. (Ibid.: 595) 
If that is the case, then P3 needs to be reformulated along these lines:  
…the claim should not be that the existing law does not protect all that is religious, 
according to some ordinary-meaning, semantic understanding of the term. Rather, 
the claim is that the law fails to protect practices which exhibit those normative 
values – still to be specified – which are valuable in religion. (Ibid.: 584) 
 The relevant values will be have to be specified “against the implicit or explicit 
background of a theory of fairness as inclusiveness.” (Ibid.: 583) If we reformulate P3 in 
light of this critique we will see that a further premise is needed to yield an interesting 
conclusion. And so the argument starts pointing towards Laborde’s disaggregation account 
of religious accommodation: 
P1: Liberal accommodation of religion is modelled on Christianity/Protestantism 
(belief- and/or obligation-based, private religion). 
P2: Many non-Western religions are not belief- and/or obligation-based and/or they 
are not private. 
P3*: In order to be fair, religious accommodation policy needs to pick out the 
features of religion that allow the liberal state to be inclusive towards both Western 
and non-Western religions. 
                                                            
3 Veit Bader (2007) makes a related but somewhat germane move. 
Understanding Religion, Governing Religion 
6 
P4: One way4 to pick out the relevant features of religion is to disaggregate it, i.e. to 
disperse its protection across several separate liberties. 
C: It is permissible for the liberal state to disaggregate religious liberty. 
‘Inclusive’ here means (i) not as narrow as to discriminate against non-Western 
religions, (ii) non-sectarian in the sense that the particular freedom that is protected has to 
be universally recognised, and (iii) not unfair towards non-religious citizens. The 
advantage of the disaggregation approach is precisely that, by spreading religious freedom 
over a range of liberties, it can meet all three desiderata of inclusivity at the same time. 
Note that P1 and P2 have now become idle wheels in the argument’s machinery. 
Recasting the argument in this way allows Laborde to de-claw the descriptive challenge of 
the ‘critical religion’ scholars. The truth of their empirical claims does not imperil the 
normative conclusion of the disaggregation strategy.5 However in the next section I will 
argue that there is a further sense in which the empirical dimension—the causal 
relationship between the state and the social phenomenon we call religion—generates 
difficulties for the disaggregation approach. 
 
3. The realist critique 
I want to point out a sense in which P1—the claim that standard liberal account of 
religions freedom are modelled on early-modern Christianity—still matters for the 
argument leading to the disaggregation approach. Strictly speaking, as formulated above, 
P1 is in fact irrelevant; but its subject matter isn’t. So Laborde is right that P1 in the form 
presented by most proponents of the descriptive challenge is irrelevant to the 
disaggregation approach. But here I contend that P1 is empirically false, and that when 
corrected it does become relevant. Properly understood, the causal relationship(s) between 
the state and the social phenomena it governs—in this case religion—can illuminate a 
potential problem with the disaggregation approach.   
A number of recent empirical studies suggest the falsity of P1. Liberal religious 
accommodation is not modelled on Christianity or Protestantism. By its very nature the 
state gets to pick out the features of reality that suit its purposes. What is more, in so doing 
the state actually transforms the object of its rule. Crudely, the (proto-liberal) state made 
protestantism into what it is so it could govern it. I wish to substantiate that claim by 
combining two sets of observations by empirical scholars from disparate fields. First I will 
draw on a general account of the operation of state simplification and reshaping of reality. 
Second, I will leverage recent research on the historical origins of the liberal notion of 
religion and of its place in politics. 
The first point has been made most eloquently by James C. Scott: 
                                                            
4 Laborde notes that it is possible for a mixture of different strategies to also achieve 
inclusiveness, so the conclusion here will have to be stated (relatively modestly) as about 
what is permissible, rather than required. 
5 This matters to Laborde’s approach because she leverages some of the critics’ 
arguments against versions of liberal neutrality and public reason liberalism (forthcoming, 
Part I). 
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No administrative system is capable of representing any existing social community 
except through a heroic and greatly schematised process of abstraction and 
simplification. It is not simply a question of capacity … It is also a question of 
purpose. State agents have no interest—nor should they—in describing an entire 
social reality, any more than the scientific forester has an interest in describing the 
ecology of a forest in detail. Their abstractions and simplifications are disciplined 
by a small number of objectives, and until the nineteenth century the most 
prominent of these were typically taxation, political control, and conscriptions. 
They needed only the techniques and understandings that were adequate to these 
tasks. (2005: 22-23) 
Scott draws on a variety of case studies—from state-sanctioned scientific forestry to 
land tenure schemes, from urban planning to the creation of surnames—to illustrate and 
substantiate this general claim. More precisely, as anticipated, there are two claims here: 
These state simplifications, the basic givens of modern statecraft … did not 
successfully represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they 
intended to; they represented only that slice of it that interested the official 
observer. They were, moreover, not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when 
allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be 
remade. (Ibid: 3) 
So, state simplifications both describe selectively, and reshape by describing. Recent 
historical research on the place of religion in Western political discourse and practice bears 
this out. Again crudely, historians have shown how the very category of religion is a 
product of the (liberal or proto-liberal) state. William Cavanaugh summarises his and 
other historians’ findings in this way: 
What counts as religion and what does not in any given context is contestable and 
depends on who has the power and authority to define religion at any given time 
and place. … the concept of religion … is a development of the modern liberal 
state; the religious-secular distinction accompanies the invention of private-public, 
religion-politics, and church-state dichotomies. The religious-secular distinction 
also accompanies the state’s monopoly over internal violence and its colonial 
expansion. 
… what counts as religious or secular depends on what practices are being 
authorized. The fact that Christianity is construed as a religion, whereas 
nationalism is not, helps to ensure that the Christian’s public and lethal loyalty 
belongs to the nation-state. (2009: 59-60)6 
Why does any of this matter for assessing the disaggregation approach? Taken in 
isolation, the point about state simplifications and the point about the particular history of 
the Western liberal conception of religion may seem to leave the argument untouched. But 
their conjunction illuminates an important point, of realist flavour: the reason why 
Western states have historically tended to treat religion as an obligation-centric monolith, 
or rather to sculpt it into one, is that this shape (as it were) is most amenable to the 
exercise of state power. In fact empirical work shows how non-Western states lacked the 
technology and power to exert this kind of influence (Daechsel 2011). One might further 
posit that it is for that reason that religions from those societies do not take forms that are 
easily governed by Western states. Indeed, some may even argue that it is the only 
                                                            
6 For similar accounts see Gregory (2012) and Van Creveld (2009). 
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amenable shape: the history of progressive enlargement of religious freedom, after all, 
coincided with an increasing standardisation of the forms the tolerated religions were 
supposed to take. In fact the notion of religion at stake here crystallised just as the early-
modern, sovereign state won its evolutionary struggle against other forms of political 
organisation, from the Italian city-states to the Hanseatic League, to name just the main 
defeated contenders. The upshot here is precisely that success in regimenting religion, in 
making it legible and so governable, was one important factor in the state’s success.7  
Now consider the disaggregation approach in light of that historical sketch. Laborde’s 
disaggregation strategy envisages freedom of religion as dispersed across a range of legally 
recognised categories, such as a conception of a good life, a conscientious moral obligation, 
a key feature of identity, a mode of human association, a vulnerability class, and so on 
(Ibid.: 11). What would happen in the law when different aspects of the disaggregated 
account of freedom of religion conflict? Since we are talking about the legal recognition 
and protection of religious freedom, presumably all those protected aspects are meant to be 
tied to specific rights. And only compossible rights are rights (Steiner 1994). In any case, 
even eschewing the language of rights, we can imagine that instances of religious freedom 
are more likely to conflict under the disaggregation approach as opposed to more unified 
approaches to religious freedom. For instance, religion as totalising institution is likely to 
conflict with religion as mode of association, if the latter is protected under the general 
rubric of freedom of association (think of a traditional religious community’s typical desire 
to effectively discourage its members from joining associations that contravene the 
religion’s principles, say). And so on. It looks as though the disaggregation approach 
trades the desideratum of inclusivity against the desideratum of reducing potential conflict 
within the law. This trade-off, however, runs against the grain of states’ typical mode of 
governing — on a realist view the imperative of creating and maintaining order typically 
trumps the imperative of complying with a moral standard such as inclusiveness (Williams 
2005, Rossi 2013). 
The state’s royal road (as it were) is to mould religion into a manageable shape, and the 
most manageable shape is the monolith in this case, given the desideratum of legal 
consistency and the technologies of legibility and social control made available by the rise 
of the modern European state (Asad 2005). In a nutshell, those states made religion 
relatively toothless by reducing it to a single, private practice rather than a public, political 
contender. This sort of simplification is what the state does to make the social world 
legible, itself a precondition for the effective use of its power. The disaggregation approach 
underestimates how much we need this simplifying power if we want effective states. This 
is not to deny that unified approaches suffer from many difficulties, especially when 
assessed against the backdrop of a theory of fairness as inclusiveness—indeed they suffer 
precisely from the serious difficulties the disaggregation approach explicitly tries to 
remedy.  
 
                                                            
7 For an insightful reconstruction of the rise of the sovereign state see Spruyt (1994). 
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4. Two objections, and the moral of the story (or lack thereof) 
To clarify the critique I put forward in the previous section, I shall now consider two 
objections that turn on the largely methodological issue of the relationship between 
descriptive and normative accounts of the state.  
A defender of the disaggregation approach—or more pertinently of the interpretive 
normative methodology that underpins it—would probably reply to the realist critique 
with something along these lines: it doesn’t matter that most known states, liberal or 
otherwise, tend to reduce complex social phenomena to easily governed monoliths. We are 
doing normative theory here. We are giving an account of what the state ought to be—
“laws as they might be”, to go back to Rousseau’s memorable phrase.8 
The realist reply can also go back to Rousseau. Rousseau says that we need to use our 
best descriptions (“men as they are”) to build our prescriptions (“laws as they might be”) 
on a firm foundation. But notice what Rousseau says in the paragraph immediately 
following the one on men and laws: “If I were a prince or a legislator, I should not waste 
my time in saying what ought to be done; I should do it, or hold my peace.” (1994 [1762]: 
45). Perhaps uncharacteristically, Rousseau seems dismissive of the role of normative 
argument in actual politics. Why is it that princes and legislators have this prerogative? 
Because, I suggest, princes and legislators are both empowered and constrained by their 
position of power. They can make the laws (and institutions), but they cannot just make 
them in any way they please. Imaginative talk of “laws as they might be” may well lead the 
ruler astray, for “men” and “laws” are separated by the murky, messy domain of practices 
and institutions—a domain to be bridged with political action, not political theory. On my 
reading of Rousseau’s remark, that domain is easily overlooked when we engage in “saying 
what ought to be done” (emphasis added). So here I am suggesting that the institution of 
the state is particularly troublesome for the prospects of a legal solution such as that 
envisaged by the disaggregation approach. One cannot apply normative desiderata to 
states without due consideration to the entities that states actually are.9 As the historical 
record suggests—and here the Humean-Burkean colours of the realist position emerge—
once a system of states is in place, there are limits to the degree of control we can exert 
over the forms it will take. As noted by any number of theorists—from critics of 
bureaucracy to enthusiasts for hierarchical authority—states are not very pliable, they are 
the sorts of institutions that take on a life of their own.  
One may worry, at this point, whether I haven’t fallen prey to the sort of descriptive 
fallacy Laborde correctly diagnoses in parts of ‘critical religion’ scholarship. To address 
                                                            
8 Note the parallel between this sort of reply and the liberal internationalist’s 
frustration with the international relations realist’s insistence that the international arena is 
by its very nature anarchical. On the connection between international relations realism 
and the methodological realism I employ here see McQueen (forthcoming). The general 
methodological position is outlined in Rossi & Sleat (2014). The form of genealogical 
critique I employ here is worked out and defended in Prinz & Rossi (forthcoming). 
9 This point applies to liberal and non-liberal states alike. At any rate liberalism is 
(again, historically) tied to statism, the view that the state is the principal social technology 
for the resolution of political problems (Asad 2003). 
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that objection we need to appreciate why my argument isn’t quite a point about the perils 
of ideal theory and the importance of feasibility constraints. The objection may run along 
these lines: “You realists say that states just are the sorts of institutions that treat social 
practices such as religion as monoliths, but that says nothing about whether they have 
(moral, prudential, etc.) reason to treat them as such. Unless you can provide those 
reasons, what you need to do is show that states as a matter of fact cannot adopt the 
disaggregation strategy anyhow, i.e. that the strategy is unfeasible and/or unachievable.10 
And you haven’t done that either.” There are two moves there, and realists can and should 
respond to both. They can do so in one move. The realist critique does explain why the 
state has reason to treat religion as a monolith: the issue is that state needs to solve what 
Bernard Williams (2005) has called the “first political question”, namely the provision of 
legitimate order. As we have seen with the help of a range of empirical literature, states 
just are the sorts of institutions that solve the first political question by turning complex 
social phenomena into legible, simplified entities. If the disaggregation approach wants to 
move to a post-state form of politics, then it should do so explicitly, and confront the many 
questions that position raises. That move would suffice to defend the realist critique.  
But we can also advance a second, more controversial line of reply. This line stresses 
how the issue at hand is not one of us not being able to put into practice the legal 
governance strategy of disaggregation. It may well be possible to set up legal entities 
continuous with today’s states that provide a set of rights according to the disaggregation 
strategy’s preferred pattern. The issue, however, is whether that sort of change, achievable 
and feasible as it may be, underestimates the importance of the typically realist 
commitments to the priority of legitimacy (Rossi 2012) and stability in modes of 
governance (Sleat 2014). That is not to say that realism condemns us to venerating the 
status quo. The point is rather that if change is called for then it shouldn’t be driven by a 
project of amelioration of the instantiation of pre-political moral ideals such as liberal 
freedoms or ideals of fairness and inclusiveness. In a realist perspective the drivers of 
change should be presented as part of the ongoing project of providing legitimate order 
(rather than raw domination) that is the hallmark of politics itself.11So, in conclusion, if the 
realist critique of the disaggregation account of religious freedom succeeds, we are left 
with a three-way exclusive disjunction. The first option is to simply maintain that if we are 
committed to the existence of liberal states then we must reckon with their historically 
determined limitations when it comes to accommodating social phenomena. Perhaps states 
are not very good at keeping pace with social phenomena different from the ones that 
states emerged around. As we have seen, the state moulded those phenomena to make 
them legible, and in so doing it moulded its own posture, as it were. My suggestion here is 
that the posture is more rigid than the disaggregation approach requires. The second 
option becomes available if one thinks that the simplified monolithic account of religion is 
                                                            
10 For the distinction between feasibility and achievability see Wright (2010). 
11 For instance, Robert Jubb (2015) provides an insightful example of how egalitarian 
ideals can be recast as demands for justification within what nonetheless remains a 
necessarily coercive political order. 
Understanding Religion, Governing Religion 
11 
too exclusive to be true to liberal values—in which case one should perhaps direct one’s 
frustration at the marriage of liberalism and the state. The third and even more radical 
option is to think that the very existence of states is normatively problematic: perhaps 
there are commitments and social practices (such as religion, whatever that may be) which 
we have reason to value more than we value the goods provided by states. All three 
options are compatible with the realist methodological stance deployed here, which goes to 
show how this kind of realism can overcome its associations with conservative tendencies 
(Rossi 2015). Adjudicating between the options would take us far beyond the scope of this 
essay.12 
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